From Group Member to Democratic Citizen: How Deliberating with Fellow Jurors Reshapes Civic Attitudes

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This investigation assesses the attitudinal impact of one of America’s most distinctive and famous group activities—jury deliberation. Tocqueville and the U.S. Supreme Court have both reasoned that jury service can promote civic engagement and recent research supports this view. The present study examines whether the attitudinal impact of jury deliberation depends on the quality of one’s jury experience. Two panel surveys of 2,410 total jurors tested the reciprocal relationship between the subjective experience of deliberation and the changes in civic attitudes toward oneself, fellow citizens, and public institutions. Principal results of structural equation models showed multiple effects of jury deliberation on attitudes, but there were no effects on one’s civic identity and political self-efficacy. Reciprocally, every civic attitude except faith in fellow citizens was predictive of deliberative experience in at least one of the two studies. Overall, the study bolsters the claim of deliberative democratic theorists that the experience of consequential face-to-face talk can make private individuals into public citizens by reinforcing their confidence in fellow citizens and public institutions.

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Group discussion can be a powerful experience, a fact long recognized in the United States. Group education was the purpose of early 20th-century civic education programs (Keith, 2007), and modern equivalents reemerged at the end of the last century to reaffirm the value of public discussion (Gastil & Keith, 2005). In the nation’s network of public schools, which may be the largest public institution, group discussion has become a classroom staple at every educational level (Allen & Plax, 1999, 2002). Faith in public discussion is so strong in American society that the “public discussion model” of communication has achieved the status of a “special
model of communication” embedded in America’s larger cultural norms and practices (Bormann, 1996, pp. 99–103).

Given the presumed value of participating in group discussion, it is remarkable that communication scholars have not already investigated its virtues within one of America’s most distinctive and famous group settings—the jury room. Though many countries use juries to some degree, the overwhelming majority of the world’s jury trials occur in the United States (Vidmar, 2001). The United States is also the principal site of jury research, and communication scholars used the jury to study group decision making (e.g., Boster, Hunter, & Hale, 1991; Burnett & Badzinski, 2000; Pettus, 1990; Sunwolf & Siebold, 1998), nonverbal communication in the courtroom (Burnett & Badzinski, 2005; Pryor & Buchanan, 1984), and the potential influence of public advocacy messages on jury deliberations (O’Connor, 2006). There is a noticeable absence of research, however, on the impact of jury service on the jurors themselves.

Nonetheless, the idea that jury service can transform jurors is not new. Two centuries ago, Tocqueville (1840/1966) wrote, “I do not know whether a jury is useful to the litigants, but I am sure it is very good for those who have to decide the case. I regard it as one of the most effective means of popular education at society’s disposal” (p. 253). The U.S. Supreme Court, in Powers v. Ohio (1991), invoked Tocqueville’s Democracy in America to argue that citizens not only have the right to trial by jury but also have the right to serve on juries, owing to the jury’s value as a means of civic education. The American jury was designed to promote not only fair verdicts but also a sense of civic duty, and the experience of jury deliberation may boost citizens’ sense of civic responsibility and levels of public activity. Such benefits may be invoked by Tocqueville and the Supreme Court, but are they real?

This question is important because it tests the breadth of the general claim that group discussion is a powerful means of social influence and education. It is now well established that groups typically have tangible social (Anderson, Riddle, & Martin, 1999) and educational (Allen & Plax, 2002) effects, but many communication scholars assume that such long-term effects come from ongoing bona fide groups integrated into people’s lives at home, work, or school (Putnam & Stohl, 1990). Juries, by contrast, typically form and dissolve in just a few days, and jurors have no prior (and typically no future) contact with one another. Could the ubiquitous influence of group discussion exist even in such fleeting group encounters? And do civic attitudes have a reciprocal effect on how jurors experience deliberation?

The purpose of this study was to answer those questions by examining the relationships between jury deliberation and a broad range of civic attitudes. Based on Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw’s (2002) self-reinforcing model of public deliberation, we theorize reciprocal links between the jury experience and one’s attitudes toward oneself, one’s fellow citizens, and public institutions. To test the hypotheses, we conducted two longitudinal studies using a three-wave panel survey design augmented by public court records. Taken together, our theoretical framework and the
two studies can shed considerable light on the many hypothesized connections between jury deliberation and civic beliefs.

**Theorizing the civic experience of jury service**

Until recently, there was no direct empirical evidence regarding the link between jury service and public engagement, but recent research has demonstrated that connection (Gastil, Deess, & Weiser, 2002; Gastil, Deess, Weiser, & Larner, in press). These studies investigate how participating in criminal juries influences jurors’ subsequent voting behaviors. Taken together, they show that the critical distinction is whether the jury deliberated—not whether it reached a verdict. Specifically, those jurors who had the chance to deliberate—whether or not they reached a verdict—experienced an increase in their voting rates relative to those jurors who were seated in the jury box but never got to deliberate (due to a midtrial guilty plea, mistrial, etc.).

This suggests that the civic impact of jury deliberation depends on the precise nature of one’s jury experience. As any communication scholar knows, not all group discussions are equally deliberative, nor do participants in the same discussion necessarily have the same *subjective* experience. Drawing on research in group communication, deliberation, and civic identity, we theorize that a subjectively satisfying deliberative experience during jury service can reinforce civic identity, trust in fellow citizens, and faith in public institutions. In addition, active participation in deliberation can reinforce political self-confidence. We also reason that the same attitudes deliberation reproduces can, in turn, shape the subjective deliberative experience, as was posited by Burkhalter et al. (2002). In these ways, we theorize that the experience of jury deliberation both produces and reproduces the civic attitudes that promote engagement with the larger public world. Before stating and testing these hypotheses more formally, however, it is useful to briefly review the literature on deliberation and define more clearly the key concepts in our research.

**Deliberative democratic theory**

Democratic deliberation, as it is currently conceptualized and practiced, is a form of small group communication that is based on principles of democracy. Traditional conceptions of deliberation emphasize equality, fairness, analysis, and a focus on the public good (cf. Cohen, 1997), and recent theorists highlight the importance of deliberation’s social aspects (Asen, 1996; Bohman, 1995; Burkhalter et al., 2002; Guttmann & Thompson, 1996; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997). In the context of small groups, deliberation can be understood as a communication process that emphasizes “careful weighing of information and views,” provides equal speaking opportunities, and involves participants respectfully listening to and attempting to understand one another’s diverse perspectives (Burkhalter et al., 2002, p. 418).

The growth of scholarship on democratic deliberation has coincided with the emergence of modest deliberative civic initiatives and proposals for even more far-reaching political reforms that foreground citizen discussion (Ackerman & Fishkin,
Advocates of public deliberation have argued that making common decisions with one’s fellow citizens can be a transforming experience. In a review of modern citizen deliberation programs, Button and Ryfe (2005) conclude that “deliberative democratic forums are a powerful political and cultural resource,” and deliberation is successful to the extent that it causes positive shifts in “feelings of personal and political efficacy; reports of changes in attitudes concerning social or political responsibility; changes in degrees of social trust and empathy; and rates of long-term social and political involvement” (p. 30).

Burkhalter et al.’s (2002) theoretical model of public deliberation is useful for building hypotheses about the relationship between jury deliberation and civic attitudes. Burkhalter et al.’s “self-reinforcing” model uses structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) as a theoretical foundation to emphasize that deliberation is located in the center of a homeostatic loop. They present their argument for a reciprocal relationship between deliberation and participants’ civic attitudes and behaviors by saying: “In essence, we posit that participating in face-to-face public deliberation strengthens the cognitions, attitudes, and habits conducive to future deliberation” (Burkhalter et al., 2002, p. 413).

Specifically, Burkhalter et al. (2002) argue that deliberation influences participants’ deliberative habits, sense of citizenship and community identity, political knowledge and skill development, and political efficacy. In turn, deliberation is influenced by participants’ perceptions about the appropriateness of deliberation and potential for common ground, their analytic and communication competence, and their motivation to deliberate. Research on political discussion provides some support for this model by indicating the potential for a reciprocal relationship between communication and civic virtues and participation (Cappella, Price, & Nir, 2002; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005).

Though a modest amount of empirical research has begun to accumulate regarding deliberation (see Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Mendelberg, 2002), there is not a solid record of deliberation’s attitudinal impact, let alone in the context of jury service. Research on political conversation, however, suggests that exposure to conflicting viewpoints, a likely component of jury deliberation, leads to modest attitudinal change, including greater awareness of the rationales for opposing viewpoints, greater tolerance for those who hold conflicting viewpoints, and higher perceived legitimacy of outcomes (Mutz, 2002). Case histories of a wide variety of nongovernmental and publicly sponsored discussion programs across the globe show considerable anecdotal evidence that deliberation has attitudinal effects. Nevertheless, most of these programs do not yet systematically collect evidence of impacts (Gastil & Levine, 2005).

If jury service is akin to other forms of public deliberation, the experience of actively participating in respectful, engaging discussion with fellow jurors could reinforce a juror’s sense of civic identity, political self-confidence, and trust in his
or her fellow citizens and the deliberative process itself. Whether this good will toward fellow citizens and the jury process radiates further, to increase confidence in judges and the court system in general, is uncertain, but such legitimating effects were imagined in some of the earliest writings on deliberative theory (Habermas, 1979).

**Conceptualizing jury deliberation: Deliberative talk and mutual respect**

To understand the effect of deliberation, however, it is necessary to better explicate the meaning of deliberation. Most research on deliberation has treated it as a dichotomous variable, presuming that if one gathers together with fellow citizens for a discussion, then one is deliberating (e.g., Fishkin & Luskin, 1999). However, Burkhalter et al.’s (2002) conceptual definition provides specific communicative dimensions of small group deliberation. Essentially, people deliberate when they carefully examine a problem and a range of solutions through an open, inclusive discussion that respects diverse points of view. This broad definition is useful for understanding deliberation in a variety of small group settings and is generally consistent with instructions given to jurors.

Jury deliberation has always been a black-box subject, with precious few exceptions to the rule that one cannot watch real juries deliberate. This makes it difficult for researchers to investigate the extent to which specific communicative practices of juries are similar to theoretical conceptions of public deliberation. For the purposes of this study, we adapt Burkhalter et al.’s (2002) definition to emphasize deliberative qualities of the jury’s decision making as well as the social aspect of mutual respect.

**Deliberative talk.** One way to assess jury deliberation was to examine the nature of communication that took place during deliberation. In the context of a jury trial, we can say that a group has deliberated if its analysis of the case was rigorous, jurors weighed the evidence carefully, and they discussed the instructions given by the judge (these being analogous to a predefined set of evaluative criteria). High-quality jury deliberation also involves a social dimension, which entails adequate opportunities for each juror to speak and participate in the decision making.

**Respect.** A separate social dimension of the experience of deliberating with fellow jurors is respect, which has been stressed as critical by many deliberative theorists (Benhabib, 1992; Burkhalter et al., 2002; Fishkin, 1991; Mansbridge, 1983). Mutual respect is a key component of successful deliberation, and feeling respected by other group members is especially important during disagreement (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997).

Members who sense a lack of respect might be reticent to voice their opinions and could find it easier to discount the perspectives of other group members. Alternatively, feeling respected could enable both speaking and careful listening, which are important aspects of group deliberation. Indeed, Henningsen and Henningsen (2004) found that group members’ needs for social approval influenced the amount and type of information they shared in small group discussions. A sense of respect from one’s fellow group members can meet a need for social approval, which can
make group members more comfortable sharing information and participating in deliberation.

As the saying goes, respect begets respect. When an individual feels respected, he or she is likely, in turn, to respect the other members of the deliberative group and the institutions that support the deliberation. Thus, we theorize that a critical variable in predicting changes in jurors’ attitudes toward other citizens, juries, and institutions is the degree to which they feel that other jurors have treated them with respect during deliberation.

**Satisfaction with deliberation.** Finally, it is useful to assess jurors’ overall satisfaction with the deliberative process. Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory emphasizes that socialization processes often depend on the experience of behavioral reward. In the case of jury service, there is only negligible monetary reward, and satisfactory completion of the deliberative task is, in a meaningful sense, “its own reward.” Thus, we reason that it is principally a satisfying experience that leads to the kind of positive civic attitudinal changes described in the deliberation literature. This is consistent with Gastil and Dillard’s (1999) finding that participants in the National Issues Forums often “discover that they can deliberate together, rather than arguing against one another” (p. 189). That “discovery” only occurs, presumably, when one has a satisfactorily deliberative experience.

**Summary.** Pulling these elements together, we argue that attitude changes are likely to result from a satisfying experience of jury deliberation in which jurors have a favorable impression of their deliberation and the decision ultimately reached as a result of that deliberation. Moreover, we believe that both overall satisfaction and civic attitude changes result from the deliberative practice itself, as embodied in rigorous discussion, equal opportunities to speak, and mutual respect.

**Changing civic attitudes**

Though the broader deliberative theoretic framework provides a general rationale for expecting juror attitude change, it remains necessary to clarify the nature (and significance) of those hypothetical changes and to further theorize what particular features of deliberation are essential to generating such change. Below, we explicate key civic attitudes and consider the means by which deliberation might shape them.

**Civic identity**

In his book *The Fall of Public Man*, Sennett (1976) laments a transformation in public life from one of concern and consideration for a communal sense of identity to a more personal sense of identity. Tocqueville’s (1840/1966) observations of American democracy support Sennett’s thesis, in that Tocqueville described an America in which the individual, as citizen, was valued. Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1996) make a similar argument when they note that American citizens have experienced a shift in motivation from civic participation for the good of the community to private action in pursuit of individual interests.
The shift in citizen identity described above demonstrates the importance of examining how a communal sense of citizen identity is strengthened. If civic identity can change over generations, we presume it can do so during the course of a single life cycle. We conceptualize identity as malleable, and we argue that identity is constructed through communication and interaction with others (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1983). Thus, an individual’s sense of self as an active citizen might change as a result of participating in public events, importantly including the unique experience of jury deliberation.

Both Warren (1992) and Burkhalter et al. (2002) argue that participating in deliberation can transform one’s civic identity. “Because it entails the consideration of multiple viewpoints, deliberation is likely to produce a more inclusive public identity. After deliberating, people are more likely to recognize the values and views they share with others, as well as to obtain a broader sense of joint membership in political units” (Burkhalter et al., 2002, p. 415). Participating in a successful jury deliberation has the potential to shift the sense of self from a private individual to a citizen-juror with civic responsibilities. Through participating in deliberation, jurors are able to have their ideas heard and to see that their opinions and statements make a difference in the final decision; consequently, they may begin to think of themselves as citizens who have viable opportunities and significant obligations in the civic sphere.

Political self-confidence
A sense of civic responsibility may be an important contributor to a lifetime of civic engagement, but equally important is the sense that one is capable of contributing to the larger community. Self-efficacy is the belief that one can effectively carry out an action (Bandura, 1986), and it is an important consideration when attempting to explain the presence or absence of “behaviors over which people have incomplete volitional control” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). Past research in political science has found that this variable, often called “internal efficacy” (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991), cannot only shape future political participation (Wolfsfeld, 1985) but also be shaped by participation (Finkel, 1985). As a result of taking part in politics, citizens develop more confidence in their ability to take competent political action.

Research on deliberation, in particular, has also found changes in participants’ sense of political efficacy. Answering a standard set of political efficacy questions, participants in a 3-day national “deliberative poll” showed increased confidence in their own political knowledge and abilities (Fishkin & Luskin, 1999). Gastil (2004) qualified these general effects by finding that attitude changes in a national discussion program were conditional on the nature of the deliberative experience. Gastil concluded that “deliberative civic education’s effects are associated with the nature of participants’ perceptions of their forum experiences” (p. 325). Deliberation had maximum effect when discussion participants read the preforum briefing materials and actively participated in the deliberation.

The Gastil et al. (2002, in press) studies showing a connection between jury deliberation and future voting rates hypothesized that political self-confidence might
be the mediating variable between service and voting. One consistent finding across these studies is that active participation is a key catalyst for changing self-confidence. This returns to the core idea that trust in one’s own abilities develops through behavioral enactment—through effective participation in the activity in question (Bandura, 1986). The question remains whether jurors can transfer a successful jury experience to generalized confidence in a wider range of public activities. Nonetheless, we expect that jury deliberation is likely to boost political self-confidence to the extent that one actively participates in it.

*Faith in citizens, juries, and larger institutions*

It is one thing for deliberation to reshape one’s civic identity and political self-confidence. It is another thing for a juror to change attitudes toward other citizens, let alone the larger institutions of government.

Trust in fellow citizens to take joint responsibility for the larger public good is connected to civic identity, but it is a distinct concept. A belief in personal virtue may not imply faith in the virtue of others. This faith in others—or social trust—is a basic element of social capital; it is the connective tissue that holds together modern democratic societies (Putnam, 2000).

Restoring confidence in juries, courts, and other government institutions is also important because it can strengthen the fragile public trust that can be eroded by regular consumption of conventional media (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Moy & Pfau, 2000). Public cynicism may also be growing toward juries, which media often portray as irrational and irresponsible, particularly in civil cases (Haltom & McCann, 2004; Hans, 2000) but also in high-profile criminal cases, such as the trials of O. J. Simpson, Robert Blake, and Michael Jackson.

There is evidence that participation in meaningful public deliberation can have restorative effects on public trust (Fishkin & Luskin, 1999; Gastil & Dillard, 1999). Again, however, such impacts may be conditional on the nature of one’s experience in deliberation, with attitude change depending in part on reading and hearing exhortations during the deliberative forum to change one’s attitudes in these ways (Gastil, 2004).

Taking this out of the particular context of political deliberation, it may be possible to theorize changed perceptions of others by looking at the group experience in the public educational context. Allen and Plax (2002) reviewed research on group discussion in classrooms from kindergarten to the graduate level and found that the group discussion method of instruction was associated not only with improved content learning for a variety of subjects but also had varied “relational” impacts, such as building affinity, interpersonal attraction, friendship, and interethnic relations while suppressing ethnocentrism and chauvinism. Just as learning with ethnically diverse students changes one’s conceptions of other students’ larger ethnic communities, so might jury deliberation change one’s conceptions of other juries, courts, and—perhaps—government institutions beyond the courthouse.
Reciprocal effects: Attitudes shaping deliberation

This investigation focuses principally on the effect of jury deliberation on civic attitudes, but it also provides the opportunity to assess the effect of prior attitudes on one’s experience at jury service. Small group research has long recognized the role of attitudes and traits in shaping group life (e.g., Bales, 1950), and decades of studies show the influence of such variables on how people experience groups (Moynihan & Peterson, 2001). The particular attitudes studied herein, however, have not been connected to group discussion, though Burkhalter et al. (2002) theorize that deliberation is promoted by the very attitudes it tends to reinforce.

Although political discussion is not synonymous with deliberation, two strands of research have demonstrated the potential for reciprocal relationships between citizens’ political discussion and their civic attitudes and participation. The research of Cappella and his colleagues on the Electronic Dialogue Project (Cappella et al., 2002; Price & Cappella, 2002) demonstrates that participating in online deliberative discussion groups can increase people’s argument repertoire, political engagement, and community participation. Cappella et al. (2002) argue that there is a “spiral between deliberative discussion and AR [argument repertoire], with each being a causal force in the other’s growth at a later time” (p. 88).

Similarly, work by Eveland and his colleagues (Eveland, 2001; McLeod et al., 1996; Shah et al., 2005) provides evidence that citizen discussion “plays a critical role in the relationship between information seeking via mass media and participation in civic life” (Shah et al., 2005, p. 553). This body of work supports the notion of reciprocal effects between deliberation and civic attitudes by showing how participating in online political discussions influences and is influenced by citizens’ civic engagement.

Outside the particular domains of deliberation and discussion, it has been shown that the relationship between political self-confidence and participation in public life is a reciprocal one (Finkel, 1985), with feelings of efficacy triggering behavior (Wolfsfeld, 1985). More generally, the civic attitudes considered herein are more common among those persons who are most politically active and are often presumed necessary to support an active democratic public (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 2000; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Thus, we expect that one’s attitudes prior to jury service will shape his or her experience of jury deliberation in much the same way that deliberation, in turn, reinforces one’s civic identity, political self-confidence, and public trust.

General hypotheses

The foregoing discussion can be summarized in a set of three general hypotheses presented here in reverse causal order. First, the jury experience causes attitude change: Positive changes in jurors’ civic identity and trust in fellow citizens and public institutions flow from (H1a) the deliberative quality of talk in the jury room and (H1b) overall satisfaction with the jury deliberation and verdict. Also, (H1c) active participation in jury deliberation reinforces one’s sense of political self-confidence.
Second, a conclusive, deliberative, and involving experience promotes overall satisfaction with the jury’s deliberation and verdict. More precisely, (H2a) the more complete the jury’s verdict, the more satisfying the experience, and (H2b) the more deliberative the quality of talk in the jury room, the higher the juror rates his or her experience.

Third, positive civic attitudes are conducive to a deliberative, respectful experience at jury service. Specifically, (H3a) the stronger a juror’s civic identity and the greater his or her trust in fellow citizens and public institutions, the more likely he or she is to experience respectful deliberation, and (H3b) the greater a citizen’s political self-confidence, the more likely she or he is to participate actively in jury deliberation.

To test these hypotheses, we designed two studies. As is often the case in empirical research, conducting two separate studies permits stronger inference when consistent results appear. Thus, to some extent, the second study is a replication of the first. Nevertheless, each of the two studies has a particular strength (and weakness) and in this sense they are more complementary than identical.

**Study 1: Juror treatment, hung juries, and civic attitudes**

The first study examined a large and diverse sample of jurors in a county court system. It had the advantage of large sample size, a great variety of trials, and a significant lag time between the jury service and the postservice measurement of attitude change, which permits stronger inferences about enduring attitude change. Because the judges reviewing this study protocol rejected questions describing jurors’ direct participation in the deliberation, it was not possible to test Hypotheses 1c and 3b, which regarded the reciprocal effects of active participation and political self-confidence.

**Participants**

*Sample characteristics*

To test the other hypotheses, we collected complete jury service records and survey data for 2,143 King County (in Washington, a state in the U.S. Pacific Northwest) residents who served on juries that deliberated at the King County Courthouse and at the Kent Regional Justice Center between February 10, 2004, and August 20, 2004. Even considering only the subset that completed all three survey waves (\(N = 938\)), this study had ample statistical power.

Fifty-two percent of the jurors were female, and 88% were White, with 6.0% Asian American, 2.4% African American, 2.0% Native American, and 1.2% Hispanic. The median educational level was a college degree (BA, BS, or AB), with 36.7% having less formal education and 29.6% having more. The median age was 48, with the middle 50% of jurors between 38 and 57 years.

*Jury panel and trial characteristics*

The number of jurors reporting on any given first day of service was roughly 150–250. In general, each trial required a pool of 35–50 jurors in voir dire to empanel 12 jurors.
Jurors all served in King County Superior or District Court. Seventy-seven percent of these jurors served on criminal trials, ranging from murder to misdemeanors, with the remainder sitting in an equally diverse set of civil trials. The median juror spent 4 days in the courtroom, with 76% spending 8 or fewer days there. The median juror deliberated for 4 hours, with 83% deliberating for 7 hours or fewer. Forty-nine percent of the jurors were part of a jury that formally requested a judge’s assistance during deliberation.

Data collection procedures

Court records
A member of the research team contacted King County officials to determine the best means of collecting jury records. Researchers then visited the two King County courthouses every week of the study to photocopy relevant court documents, and as each King County trial concluded the jurors who took part in deliberation were identified. Each relevant court document pertaining to these jurors was keyed into a database that recorded juror names and trial characteristics. Before being deleted, this information was used to positively match official juror records with corresponding identifying information in the surveys.

Administration of surveys

Wave 1 survey. During the study period, researchers attempted to approach every person who signed in for jury duty to request their voluntary participation in a study on “community life,” a generic phrasing designed to deemphasize jury service and its relation to other subjects addressed in the questionnaire. This first survey was typically administered after jury orientation but before jurors had been sent to courtrooms. This first survey measured preservice attitudes, demographics, and other variables.

The present study concerns only those persons who ultimately served on a jury that deliberated. According to King County court records, 2,655 persons deliberated on juries during the study period, and we obtained 2,136 completed Wave 1 surveys. This yields a response rate of 80.4% for the first survey, though we estimate the cooperation rate as 84% because approximately 4% of those reporting to service were sent to courtrooms before research staff could administer the survey.

Wave 2 survey. A random subset of those who responded in Wave 1 were contacted again after completing their jury service and invited to complete a follow-up survey on paper or online that included questions about their attitudes and their jury experiences. A repeated-contact design (Dillman, 1999) sent postcards, up to two survey booklets, reminders, and thank you cards to potential respondents. Of those 1,216 deliberating jurors who were contacted again via a valid e-mail or mailing address, 969 provided complete Wave 2 surveys (response rate = 80%). The median lag time between completing jury service and returning the Wave 2 survey was 22 days.
Wave 3 survey. In November 2004, months after completing jury service, jurors were contacted for a final time to record the conclusive measure of their attitudes. As in Wave 2, respondents were invited to complete the survey on paper or online and repeated contacts yielded a response rate of 77%. The median lag time between receiving and returning the Wave 3 survey was 2 weeks.

Court records and survey measures

Trial outcomes
Trial outcomes were recorded using official King County court records. The Verdict Reached variable was created to distinguish inconclusive from conclusive (verdict reaching) deliberative experiences. This is akin to the key variable in Gastil et al. (2002), except that Verdict Reached was treated as a continuous variable with four values: no verdict (8.6% of jurors participated in juries that failed to reach a verdict on any charge), mostly hung (4.1% were hung on the main charge or multiple charges), mostly conclusive (1.7% reached verdicts on all but a minor charge), and full verdict (85.7% were hung on none of the charges).

Deliberative experience

Juror treatment/respect. Due to restrictions required by the King County judges, this first study could not directly measure deliberative talk—only how jurors felt treated by their peers, a crude proxy measure for the feeling of respect. This variable was captured with a single item in the Wave 2 survey: “How were you treated by fellow jurors?” Available responses were coded thusly: less than satisfactory (1), satisfactory (2), good (3), very good (4), and excellent (5) (M = 4.21, SD = 0.88).

Satisfaction with deliberation/verdict. Two items in the Wave 2 survey captured jurors’ overall satisfaction with the jury’s deliberation and ultimate decision. Jurors were asked how they would rate “their satisfaction with the jury’s final verdict” and “the quality of the jury’s deliberations.” Responses were recorded on a 4-point scale from very unsatisfied (1) to very satisfied (4). Responses to the two questions were strongly correlated (r = .55) and produced a reliable two-item scale (α = .70, M = 4.21, SD = 0.88).

Civic and political attitudes
Seventeen attitude items were included in the Wave 1, Wave 2, and Wave 3 surveys to measure attitudes at each point in time. These items were theorized to measure five distinct attitudes: civic identity, civic faith, confidence in jury, confidence in judiciary, and perceived system responsiveness. Items for perceived system responsiveness were taken from the conventional political science measure of “external” political efficacy (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990). All other measures were developed for this study through a series of pretests.

A factor analysis (varimax rotation) produced a solution consistent with the five-factor theoretical model. The solution explained 61% of item variance, and the same
solution was obtained when a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0 was used to determine the number of factors. All items were loaded at .50 or higher on their theoretical factors; only two items were loaded at .30 or higher on other factors, and in both cases, the stronger loading was on the hypothesized factor. The left-hand columns of Table 1 provide complete item wordings for the five attitude scales and summarizes the Wave 1 scale sizes, reliabilities, means, and standard deviations for each of the five factors.

Results

Model design and fit statistics

All hypothesis tests were conducted using the same basic procedure. Figure 1 shows the structural equation model used for civic identity; the only differences in model specification among the five attitude models were the indicators used to measure the latent attitude variables. Each model included the hypothesized causal paths, the full measurement model for each latent variable, and the correlated errors from the three waves of attitude items.³

Model fit. The model shown in Figure 1 is representative of all five attitude models in the strength of the model fit. The model produced a significant $\chi^2 = 80.56$, $df = 51$. This basic statistic is not very revealing, as “in very large samples virtually all models … would have to be rejected as statistically untenable” (Bentler & Bonett, 1980, p. 591). Better indicators include the Bentler-Bonett normed fit index (NFI) that compares the minimum discrepancy of the tested model against a baseline. The obtained value of 0.976 suggests a very good fit, as Bentler and Bonnet found that only “models with overall fit indices of less than .9 can usually be improved substantially” (p. 600). An alternative fit measure is root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), a population discrepancy measure that compensates for model complexity. The RMSEA value for this model was 0.016, well below the 0.05 limit indicating a close fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). The other models also met these same standards for fit.

Model adjustment. Though model fit exceeded these standards without adding or removing paths, post hoc analysis also found juror treatment/respect associated with Verdict Reached ($\beta = .13, SE = 0.033$). The path was drawn from juror treatment because interactions with fellow jurors temporally preceded the jury’s final verdict. This path varied only negligibly across the five different attitude models. In addition, initial models were revised by removing any nonsignificant causal paths ($p > .05$).

Hypothesis 1: Predicting attitude change

The central paths in Figure 1 demonstrate the key hypothetical associations between deliberative experience and postjury service attitudes. In this model, there were no significant associations between juror experience and attitude change. The model was recalculated removing these paths, and the final result was a model with no causal paths from juror experience to postservice attitude, as shown in Diagram A within Figure 2.⁴
Table 1 Scale Items, Sizes, Wave 1 Reliabilities (Alpha), Means, and Standard Deviations for Civic Attitudes for King County and Seattle Municipal Jurors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale (and Items)</th>
<th>King County (Study 1)</th>
<th>Seattle (Study 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic identity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic faith</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in jury</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in judiciary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived system responsibility</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political self-confidence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each item had a corresponding 5-point Likert-type scale, labeled as follows: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), neutral (3), agree (4), and strongly agree (5). The exceptions are those items marked with an *, which had this instruction: “Below is a list of four public institutions. Please mark one of the ovals provided to tell us how you would rate the average quality of the decisions each one makes,” with a response scale labeled very low (1), low (2), neutral (3), high (4), and very high (5).
The next three diagrams in Figure 2, however, all have significant paths from juror treatment/respect to postservice attitudes. Paths are significant to civic faith ($\beta = .13$), trust in the jury ($\beta = .15$), and trust in judges ($\beta = .09$). In addition, the path from deliberative satisfaction to trust in jury is significant ($\beta = .23$). There are no significant paths from these variables to perceived system responsiveness.

These results show that deliberative satisfaction does not account for the influence of felt respect on civic attitudes, as it only appears as a mediator in the case of trust in the jury; even in that case, juror treatment/respect has a direct effect as well as an indirect one. Overall, these results provide evidence supporting Hypothesis 1a,
with juror treatment predicting increased trust in fellow citizens, juries in general, and the judiciary. Hypothesis 1b, regarding overall satisfaction with deliberation and verdict, was supported only in the case of increased confidence in juries.

Hypothesis 2: Predicting satisfaction with deliberation/verdict
The paths in the top half of Figure 1 confirmed the hypothesized paths to satisfaction from Verdict Reached ($\beta = .41, SE = 0.027, p < .01$) and from treatment by other jurors ($\beta = .33, SE = 0.026, p < .01$). These path coefficients varied only negligibly across the five different attitude models, and the findings confirmed Hypotheses 2a and 2b, respectively.

Figure 2 Standardized paths (and standard error) in final structural equation models for five civic attitudes for King County jurors.

Note: Paths are represented by standardized coefficients (with standard error in parentheses). One-tailed alphas significant at *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$. 
Hypothesis 3: Attitudinal influence on deliberative experience
There is also clear evidence of prior civic attitudes shaping one’s perceptions—the hypothesized reciprocal effects. Figure 2 shows that jurors’ perceptions of treatment/respect were predicted by four of the prejury service attitudes, including civic identity ($b = .09$), trust in the jury system ($b = .08$), trust in judges ($b = .12$), and perceived system responsiveness ($b = .10$). The latter attitude also had a direct path to satisfaction with deliberation/verdict ($b = .12$).

Discussion
Overall, this study found support for all three of the study’s main hypotheses: Post-jury service attitudes were influenced by the subjective experience of jury deliberation, satisfaction with deliberation/verdict was predicted by both trial outcome and juror treatment, and juror treatment/respect was predicted by prior civic attitudes. What was not found were multiple significant paths linking juror satisfaction with preservice and postservice civic attitudes. (The exceptions were that satisfaction predicted postservice trust in the jury system and perceived system responsiveness predicted satisfaction.) As for the nonsignificant findings, the large sample size of this first study gave it the statistical power to detect even the smaller variety of effects. Nevertheless, it is possible that a more detailed measure of deliberation, including more direct questions about how jurors behaved in the jury room, might reveal effects unseen in this first study. A second study with a new sample also permits retesting the general findings of this first study to assess their robustness.

Study 2: Juror participation, deliberative talk, and civic attitudes
The second study examined jurors in a municipal court system. This study had the advantage of a more detailed postservice questionnaire, as the city judges had no objections to asking jurors about their own and others’ participation in deliberation. This made it possible to test Hypotheses 1c and 3b, which were not included in Study 1. In addition, jurors’ recollections of their experience typically were collected just after jury service, which is likely to yield higher fidelity juror recollections. The second study, however, involved a more narrow range of cases (low-stakes criminal charges) and had a smaller, slightly more homogenous set of participants. Also, the sample contained too few hung juries to permit retesting Hypothesis 2a.

Participants
Sample characteristics
For Study 2, we collected complete jury service records and survey data for 267 Seattle, WA, residents who served on juries that deliberated at the Municipal Courthouse between March 9, 2004, and July 20, 2004.
Statistical power was a greater concern in this study, as only 164 respondents completed all three survey waves. Given that effects found in Study 1 suggested a small-to-moderate population effect size, and because in many respects, this study was designed as a replication, alpha was one tailed and set at .10.

Fifty-two percent of the Seattle jurors were female, and 84% were White, with 8.2% Asian American, 3.4% African American, 1.7% Native American, and 1.9% Hispanic. The median educational level was a college degree (BA, BS, or AB), with 26.7% having less formal education and 40.7% having more. The median age was 49, with the middle 50% of jurors between 38 and 58 years.

**Jury panel and trial characteristics**
The number of jurors reporting on any given first day of service was roughly 40–50. In general, each trial required a pool of 15 persons in voir dire to empanel six jurors. Jurors all served on criminal juries in the Seattle Municipal Court. Nearly, a third (32.2%) sat on juries hearing low-level assault charges, another 16.1% heard drunk-driving cases, and the rest heard a range of minor offenses from sexual indiscretion to reckless driving. The median juror spent 2 days in the courtroom, with 91% spending 3 or fewer days there. The median juror deliberated for no more than 1 hour, with 84% deliberating for 2 hours or fewer. Thirty-seven percent of the jurors were part of a jury that formally requested a judge’s assistance during deliberation.

**Data collection procedures**
Each juror in the data set had information from the same types of data sources used in Study 1 and the same procedures were used to collect the data. One important procedural difference was that exactly 50% of the sample completed their Wave 2 survey at the courthouse itself, just after completion of their jury service. In terms of the variables measured, this sample included only 14 hung jurors, so no variable was created to distinguish between those who reached full verdicts and those who did not.

As in Study 1, all response rates were well above conventional standards. Seventy-nine percent of those appearing for jury service completed the Wave 1 survey. Eighty-seven percent of those invited to complete the Wave 2 survey did so and 64% of those invited in Wave 3 sent back a complete survey.

**Survey measures**

**Deliberative experience**

*Deliberative talk/respect.* The first study was limited to a single-item measure that tapped jurors’ sense of how they were treated by their fellow jurors. Study 2 augmented this item with four measures of specific aspects of deliberation, as conceptualized by Burkhalter et al. (2002). Each item had a corresponding 5-point Likert-type scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The juror treatment question was joined by an item more directly measuring the respectfulness of juror interaction:
“All of the jurors listened respectfully to each other during deliberation.” The rigorousness of the case analysis and weighing of evidence were operationalized by two items: “Jurors thoroughly discussed the relevant facts of the case” and “The jury thoroughly discussed the instructions the judge provided.” Finally, the equality of opportunities to speak was measured by the item: “The other jurors gave me enough of a chance to express my opinions about the case.” A factor analysis (varimax rotation) of these five items produced a single-factor solution. Reliability analysis produced a scale alpha of .81 ($M = 4.41, SD = 0.53$). Removal of the jury treatment item would have increased alpha slightly to .83, but the item was retained to provide continuity with Study 1.

**Participation in jury deliberation.** Three items were created to measure the degree to which jurors actively participated in jury deliberation. Jurors were asked about their explanatory contributions (“How often did you explain evidence or facts?”), speaking from personal experience (“How often did you speak about your own experiences?”), and stating their point of view (“How often did you express your own views?”). Responses were on a 4-point scale, including never (1), once or twice (2), three or four times (3), and more than four times (4). The three items were all correlated (minimum $r = .23$) and were combined to create a participation scale ($\alpha = .57, M = 2.43, SD = 0.64$).

**Satisfaction with deliberation/verdict.** The same items from Study 1 were combined to measure jurors’ satisfaction with the deliberation and verdict ($\alpha = .63, M = 3.42, SD = 0.67$).

**Civic and political attitudes**

Identical items were used in Study 2 to measure civic and political attitudes, except that three additional items were included to measure political self-confidence. These new items were taken from a pool of conventional political science measures of “internal” political efficacy (Craig et al., 1990). The same factor analytic procedures produced the same results, with the theorized six-factor solution confirmed (accounting for 65% of variance) and the same solution obtained when a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0 was used to set the number of factors. Item wording and scale reliabilities, means, and standard deviations for Study 2 appear in Table 1.

**Results**

**Model design and fit statistics**

As in Study 1, all hypothesis tests were conducted using structural equation modeling. Figure 3 shows the initial model used for civic identity, which was the same design used for all attitudes except political self-confidence. Each model included the hypothesized causal paths, the full measurement model for each latent variable, and the correlated errors from the three waves of attitude items.

The five civic identity/trust models had a satisfactory fit overall. Fit statistics were similar for civic identity (NFI = 0.865, RMSEA = 0.054), civic faith (0.883, 0.046),
trust in jury (0.870, 0.052), confidence in judges (0.913, 0.059), and perceived system responsiveness (0.886, 0.047). The NFI scores hover above and below the 0.9 threshold, above which fit cannot be improved substantially, and the RMSEA figures were close to the 0.05 standard for close fit. These figures changed only marginally when nonsignificant paths were removed. In the interest of consistency with Study 1 and avoiding posthoc fine-tuning for the sake of marginal fit improvement, no further changes were made to the structural equation models.

Hypothesis 1: Predicting attitude change

Civic identity and trust. The central paths in Figure 3 demonstrate the key hypothetical associations between deliberative experience and postjury service attitudes. In this model, there were no significant associations between juror experience and...
attitude change. The model was recalculated removing these paths, and the final result was a model with no causal paths from juror experience to postservice attitude, as shown in Diagram A within Figure 4.

For the other postjury civic attitudes, Figure 4 shows three significant effects. Paths reached significance from deliberation/verdict satisfaction to trust in judges (\(\beta = .25\)) and perceived system responsiveness (\(\beta = .16\)). A significant direct path was also found linking deliberative talk/respect to trust in jury (\(\beta = .19\)). Diagram B in Figure 4 also had a path from deliberation/verdict satisfaction to civic faith (\(\beta = .10\)), but this was a nonsignificant effect (\(p = .125\)). Its path was left in the final model to produce model convergence, which was not obtained with its removal.

Figure 4 Standardized paths (and standard error) in final structural equation models for five civic attitudes for Seattle municipal jurors.

Note: Paths are represented by standardized coefficients (with standard error in parentheses). One-tailed alphas significant at *\(p < .05\), **\(p < .01\).
Taken together, these results demonstrate mixed support for Hypothesis 1a: There were significant effects from deliberative experience to trust in jury, confidence in judges, and a larger sense of system responsiveness; however, Hypothesis 1a was not supported with regard to civic identity and the link to civic faith did not quite reach significance. Hypothesis 1b was supported for both trust in judges and perceived system responsiveness.

Political self-confidence. This second study also made it possible to test Hypothesis 1c, which posits that active participation in jury deliberation reinforces one’s sense of political self-confidence. Figure 5 shows the initial model for this dependent variable in which the path from participation in jury deliberation to postservice self-confidence was nonsignificant ($\beta = .055$, SE = 0.058, $p = .172$).

Figure 5 Standardized coefficients for the initial political self-confidence structural equation model.

Note: NFI = normed fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error approximation. Fit statistics (default model): $\chi^2 = 58.41$ ($df = 41$), $p = .038$. NFI = 0.965; RMSEA = 0.040. Each oval represents a latent variable, each rectangle a survey item (except Verdict Reached, which represents data obtained in court records), and each circle an error term (with the structural error ovals capturing systematic error in an item common across the three panel waves). All causal paths are statistically significant (one-tailed, $p < .05$). All numbers are standardized coefficients.
Hypothesis 2: Predicting satisfaction with deliberation/verdict
The path in the top center of Figure 3 shows a significant path from deliberative talk/respect to overall satisfaction ($\beta = .30$, $SE = 0.105$, $p < .001$). This path coefficient varied only negligibly across the six different attitude models and the findings reconfirmed Hypothesis 2b.

Hypothesis 3: Attitudinal influence on deliberative experience
Figure 4 shows multiple significant paths from attitudes to deliberative experience. Deliberative talk/respect was predicted by civic identity ($\beta = .21$) and trust in judges ($\beta = .16$), and satisfaction with deliberation/verdict was predicted directly by civic faith ($\beta = .23$), trust in jury ($\beta = .15$), and confidence in judges ($\beta = .19$).

This study was also able to test Hypothesis 3b, which holds that the greater a citizen’s political self-confidence, the more likely she or he is to participate actively in jury deliberation. Figure 5 shows that this effect was not only significant but also relatively large ($\beta = .32$, $SE = 0.104$, $p = .001$).

Discussion
Overall, this study found support for all three of the study’s general hypotheses: Postjury service attitudes were influenced by the subjective experience of jury deliberation, satisfaction with deliberation/verdict was predicted by the quality of deliberative talk, and jurors’ subjective experience in jury deliberation was linked back to prior civic attitudes. In addition, political self-confidence was found to be predictive of active participation in jury deliberation, but postjury self-confidence was not, in turn, influenced by that same participation.

Summary discussion
Understanding the significance of these two studies requires first stepping back to juxtapose the results of Study 1 and 2, and we begin this final section with an overview of the findings in the two studies. Afterward, we consider the implications of this investigation for future research and the institution of the jury.

Of deliberation and verdicts
The most straightforward result was the confirmation of Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Study 1 showed that the more complete the jury’s verdict, the more satisfying the experience, and both studies found that the more deliberative and respectful the jurors rated their talk with peers, the higher the satisfaction rating they gave for the deliberation and verdict. Both of these effects produced coefficients between .30 and .40, suggesting that these are straightforward, moderate-sized effects. An unhypothesized but related finding was that how one felt treated by jurors was positively related to the conclusiveness of one’s jury deliberations.

Taken together, these results help explain the findings of the Gastil et al. (2002, in press) studies. Recall that those studies compared empanelled jurors with different
trial outcomes and found that the experience of jury deliberation triggered increased voting. Gastil et al. (2002) drew a simple distinction between those juries that reached verdicts and those that did not. Consistent with that finding, Study 1 suggests that reaching verdicts is associated with experiencing better treatment from fellow jurors, likely reflecting the fact that hung juries can become contentious or worse during their prolonged disagreements. In addition, Study 1 shows that reaching a verdict results in a greater postjury sense of satisfaction—with both the verdict and the deliberation, per se.

At the same time, these modest correlations do not show that hung juries are nondeliberative and uniformly unsatisfying. Thus, the Gastil et al. (in press) findings—which found that the clearest contrast was between deliberating and non-deliberating juries—are consistent with this study, which found that even highly deliberative, respectful, and satisfying jury experiences can coincide with a hung jury. Reaching a verdict contributes to the sense of satisfaction with one’s jury experience, but it is not a requirement.

Changing attitudes about oneself: Civic identity and self-efficacy

Two of the hypothesized attitude changes concerned a shift in one’s self-image. Neither deliberation nor satisfaction scores predicted significant changes in neither jurors’ sense of themselves as an active member of the community (civic identity) or their sense of efficacy as political actors (political self-confidence). In sum, the collective experience of jury deliberation does not change one’s assessment of oneself as a civic individual.

This runs contrary to results commonly reported in the deliberation literature, such as Fishkin and Luskin’s (1999) finding that participation in a National Issues Convention boosted participants’ sense of political self-confidence. However, studies on other forms of civic action have found no change in self-efficacy, as in the case of studies on political campaign participation (Finkel, 1985; Freie, 1997).

Before overinterpreting these nonfindings, however, it is important to note that the lack of an effect on political self-confidence could be attributable to the small sample size in Study 2. After all, this was the only attitude change hypothesis that could not also be tested on the larger sample in Study 1. Moreover, the observed effect was in the same direction and only of smaller magnitude compared to observed effects on other attitudes ($\beta = .055, SE = .058, p = .172$).

Another possible explanation for the weak, nonsignificant effect on political self-confidence is that the variable asks specifically about one’s competence in the political arena, which jurors likely understand as largely distinct from the competency they displayed or developed in the deliberation room. Thus, it makes sense that participation in a political discussion group, such as in a National Issues Convention or a National Issues Forum, could boost political self-efficacy, whereas participation in a criminal or civil jury could not do so as readily. This view is consistent with Morrell’s (2005) recent experimental finding that political discussion is more likely
to promote deliberation-specific self-confidence than a generalized sense of political efficacy.

The absence of an effect on civic identity is likely a more robust nonfinding, as a total of four potential paths—deliberative respect/talk and satisfaction in two studies—failed to produce a single significant effect. One’s civic identity may, after all, be relatively immutable or at least resistant to the cognitive effects of participation in a few days of jury deliberation.

**Changing trust in people and institutions**

Beyond changes in one’s self-image, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported in that positive changes in jurors’ trust in fellow citizens and public institutions resulted from the deliberative quality of talk in the jury room and overall satisfaction with the jury. Summarizing and interpreting these results, however, require patience, as the specific findings of Study 1 and 2 are as different as they are similar.

In the most general terms, it is clear that there is a path from deliberative experience to postjury attitudes toward other people and civic institutions. Across the two studies, the two measures of deliberative experience (respect/talk and satisfaction) had a total of 20 potentially significant paths to postjury attitudes and exactly half of those paths reached statistical significance, as was shown in Figures 2 and 4. For each of five attitudes in both studies, one or the other deliberative experience variable had a significant path, with the exception being civic identity (and perceived system responsiveness in Study 1). Moreover, the significant paths were of comparable magnitude (from .09 to .25), and all paths—significant and otherwise—pointed in the same direction.

Of the eight significant effects, however, the only one that appeared in both studies was the path from deliberative talk/respect to trust in the jury system (β = .15 in Study 1 and β = .19 in Study 2). In all other cases, the mixed findings of the two studies make it unclear whether it is the experience of deliberative talk/respect or one’s satisfaction with the deliberation/verdict that is driving changes in attitudes: In Study 1, three of the four effects are attributable to how one felt treated by fellow jurors, but in Study 2, three of the four effects flowed from satisfaction with deliberation/verdict.

One could discount this difference by simply attributing the attitude changes to “deliberative experience,” the umbrella concept that encompasses our measures of juror treatment, deliberative talk, and satisfaction with deliberation/verdict. We believe that there is value in considering two possible accounts for this difference.

First, what could account for the smaller number of deliberative satisfaction effects in Study 1? One possible explanation is that Study 2 included only criminal jury trials, whereas Study 1 encompassed both civil and criminal ones. The aforementioned studies on the impact of jury service on voting suggest that the type of trial is significant: Gastil et al. (2002) included only criminal trials, and the larger follow-up study (Gastil et al., in press) included both types of trials but found an effect only for criminal jurors. If the inclusion of civil jurors is clouding the effects in
Study 1, removing them should yield stronger paths from satisfaction to postjury attitudes. When the models with nonsignificant satisfaction → attitude paths in Figure 2 are rerun with the addition of this path and the exclusion of civil jurors, the results are weak but consistent for civic faith (β = .04, SE = 0.026, p = .179), trust in judges (β = .04, SE = 0.031, p = .135), and perceived system responsiveness (β = .05, SE = 0.029, p = .064). These paths are not as strong as in Study 2, but they are nonetheless suggestive of the potential significance of trial type as a moderator of the effect of deliberative satisfaction on attitude change.

Second, what could account for the relative scarcity of direct attitude effects from deliberative talk/respect in Study 2? Here, the most straightforward explanation is the difference in measurement: The results of Study 2 might better resemble those of Study 1 if the second study included only the juror treatment item used in Study 1. Models B–E in Figure 4 were rerun with this modification, and the treatment/respect → attitude path was measured for civic faith (β = .04, SE = 0.035, p = .282), trust in jury (β = .14, SE = 0.027, p = .014), trust in judges (β = .09, SE = 0.044, p = .105), and perceived system responsiveness (β = −.01, SE = 0.036, p = .399). The match between studies is clearer when viewed in this way, as the Study 2 path for trust in judges approaches significance and the path for perceived system responsiveness is negligible, as in Study 1. Taken together, these results suggest that when it comes to changing attitudes toward juries and judges, and perhaps fellow citizens, the experience of respect during interactions with jurors may be as important as the deliberative quality of the talk itself. Such a finding should hearten those who have emphasized the centrality of mutual respect in public deliberation and dialogue (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997).

Whether or not one accepts these emendations, the findings suggest that participation in respectful jury deliberation can bolster citizens’ confidence and faith in fellow citizens, the jury system, and the judiciary. When the deliberation and verdict are satisfying, these effects extend more broadly to increase one’s sense that the larger political system is responsive to one’s concerns. Putting these results in a group discussion context, it is useful to recall Schwartzman’s (1989) anthropological study of meetings. As her work makes clear, there is a transcultural distinction between mere groups or gatherings of people and the purposeful, structured, face-to-face meetings in which they participate. When jurors meet and deliberate effectively, it appears they are able to generalize this successful experience to the larger population of citizens and other institutional contexts in which citizens and public officials “meet” to render judgments and craft public policies.

Reciprocal effects and the cognitive antecedents of deliberation

The focus of this study was on the effect of jury deliberation on civic attitudes, not the reverse. Nonetheless, these same data made it possible to test a third hypothesis, which held that (a) higher levels of juror civic identity and public trust would be conducive to experiencing respectful, satisfying deliberation and (b) political self-confidence would promote active participation in jury deliberation.
As with the effect of deliberation on attitudes, this reciprocal effect produced a mix of significant paths across the two studies. The effect of self-confidence, tested only in Study 2, stands alone as a clear and relatively large effect ($\beta = .32$), as was shown in Figure 5. In that sense, this study provides one more piece of evidence of the ubiquitous power of political self-confidence (also known as internal or self-efficacy) to spur civic participation (Verba et al., 1995).

The five other civic attitudes predicting two measures of deliberative experience (respect/talk and satisfaction) across the two data sets yielded a total of 20 potential paths, and 10 reached significance. Once again, the details show considerable differences that merit explanation.

In Study 1, the path from prejury attitude to treatment/respect was significant for every attitude except civic faith; the size of these beta coefficients (.08 to .10) makes it unsurprising that the smaller sample in Study 2 yielded significant paths for only two of the four relationships found in Study 1. In fact, one path (system responsiveness $\rightarrow$ talk/respect) was of comparable size but nonsignificant ($\beta = .08$, $SE = 0.094$, $p = .182$). Thus, the two studies provide relatively consistent evidence of a direct effect of a range of civic attitudes on jurors’ reports of experiencing deliberative respect/talk.

Study 2 has relatively strong direct paths from attitudes to satisfaction with deliberation compared to Study 1. Once again, Study 1 models were rerun for criminal jurors only, and the result was the appearance of one more significant path (civic faith $\rightarrow$ satisfaction, $\beta = .08$, $SE = 0.067$, $p = .027$). As for the path in Study 1 that did not reach significance in Study 2 (system responsiveness $\rightarrow$ satisfaction), there is no straightforward explanation, except the reflexive shrug of insufficient statistical power.

Though there remain complexities in the different findings of Study 1 and 2, the results generally support Burkhalter et al.’s (2002) supposition that “participating in face-to-face public deliberation strengthens the cognitions, attitudes, and habits conducive to future deliberation” (p. 413). At a higher level of abstraction, this appears to be true, but precisely which attitudes reinforce which aspects of the deliberative experience is less clear.

Conclusions

Our findings demonstrate a link between the quality of the deliberative experience and changes in civic attitudes. In general, high-quality deliberation and satisfaction are predictors of civic attitude changes regarding the systematic or institutional elements of juries. How would such changes lead to an increase in voting behavior (Gastil et al., 2002, in press)? Our study suggests that it is not a change in perceptions of the self as a citizen, in political self-confidence, or trust in fellow citizens. Rather, these studies suggest that it is faith in the institutional elements of government that is affected by high-quality deliberative experiences. With hindsight, this finding makes sense. Juries and other public institutions were built on a fragile faith in the community of people and, like all aspects of the community, they reinforce the bonds of
association through their use. In short, institutions are built on faith and the exercising of that faith sustains them.

Our two studies illustrate the importance of juries for improving civic attitudes and contribute to the study of group discussion by demonstrating how the qualities of one specialized form of discussion, namely, jury deliberation, shape attitudes about the participants. One aspect of these studies that is fundamentally different from most previous group research is that these studies attempt to measure long-term attitude changes that result from participating in groups that form and dissolve in a matter of days—or even hours. On the one hand, this may be the cause for the limited impact on civic identity, political self-confidence, and civic faith. In contrast, these studies demonstrate that participants in group discussion, albeit a specialized form, experience greater satisfaction when the discussions are conclusive and include high-quality, deliberative talk (see Gastil, Burkhalter, & Black, 2007). Moreover, even though these groups are fleeting, participants experience attitude changes that reinforce the importance of group discussion in and of itself.

The findings of this study support the general proposition that public discussion does have real consequences for its participants. The “public discussion model” (Bormann, 1996) fulfills its promise as a transformative communication context, at least in the case of the jury. Moreover, the power of this group experience should remind group scholars that even groups that fail to qualify as “bona fide” (Putnam & Stohl, 1990) can be tremendously influential if they exist in a special context that requires participants to carry out significant public tasks, as in the case of the jury.

More specifically, this study bolsters the claim of deliberative theorists that the experience of consequential face-to-face talk can make private individuals into public citizens by reinforcing their confidence in fellow citizens and public institutions. Whether this kind of experience makes them look beyond narrow self-interest (Warren, 1992) requires additional research, but these findings suggest that such a profound transformation is possible. If it does occur, though, it will likely be the effect of repeated deliberative experiences rather than a single one. The small-to-moderate effect sizes seen in this study show that even just a few hours or days in the public sphere leave their mark on public attitudes, and it is certainly possible that these changes cascade over time to yield even larger changes. It is more likely, though, that the jury effectively illustrates the value of increasing the opportunities for meaningful public deliberation as a means of promoting the stability of the system as a whole. This is precisely the ambition of a growing number of deliberation advocates (Gastil & Keith, 2005), and our research suggests that their efforts are likely to help secure a participatory society and a legitimate democratic state.

Therefore, these findings should aid the cause of preserving the jury itself. Juries have become rare internationally (Vidmar, 2001), and recent legal reforms in the United States have already reduced the size and frequency of jury trials (Hans, 2002). The plea-bargaining process has further reduced the deployment of criminal juries, and many critics suggest drastically reducing the use of civil juries or dispensing with them altogether (Adler, 1994). Even without the most radical reforms, there is
already a trend toward decreased reliance on jury trials. In federal courts, the percent of criminal charges that end in verdicts has dropped from 10.4% in 1988 to 4.3%, and the percent of civil cases resolved by juries has declined from 5.4% in 1962 to 1.5% (Glaberson, 2001). Discovering a genuine civic benefit from jury service could restore luster to a tarnished institution. If that realization prolongs the life of the American jury, the larger democratic process itself would be the beneficiary.

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Notes

1 This is also the presumption of the Gastil et al. (2002, 2005) studies on juries, which had no more information regarding the deliberation than was available in official court records.
2 The judges who authorized Study 1 were even reluctant to permit detailed questions about respondents’ experience in the jury room. In the end, we were permitted only to ask jurors how they felt treated by fellow jurors and how satisfied they were with the deliberation and verdict. In Study 2, a different set of judges at a municipal court permitted the use of a few more specific questions that reached beyond juror treatment and satisfaction with deliberation.
3 We employed SEM for a number of reasons. First, records often had one or more pieces of missing data (e.g., a skipped survey item), and the SEM software we employed (Amos 5) has a well-established process using maximum likelihood estimation method for handling missing data (Byrne, 2001). Second, SEM can take into account measurement error when working with even just two indicators. Third, when measures are taken over three panel waves, it is possible to remove considerable bias from estimated paths.
between latent variables by incorporating overtime correlations among an item’s three corresponding measurement errors (Finkel, 1995, pp. 67–79).

4 One curious reviewer asked what happened if we added the direct path from Verdict Reached to the various dependent attitude measures. This path, when added, was nonsignificant for all attitudes.

References


De membre d’un groupe à citoyen démocratique : Comment la délibération avec des collègues jurés remodèle les attitudes civiques

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Résumé
Cette étude évalue l’impact sur l’attitude de l’une des activités de groupe les plus distinctives et célèbres des États-Unis : la délibération d’un jury. Alexis de Tocqueville et la Cour suprême des États-Unis ont tous deux raisonné que le service de jury peut promouvoir l’engagement civique. La recherche récente soutient cette vision.
La présente étude examine si l’impact de la délibération d’un jury sur l’attitude dépend de la qualité de l’expérience de jury d’une personne. Deux enquêtes par panel auprès d’un total de 2 410 jurés ont testé la relation réciproque entre l’expérience subjective de délibération et les changements dans les attitudes civiques envers soi-même, ses concitoyens et les institutions publiques.
Les résultats principaux des modèles par équation structurelle démontrent des effets multiples de la délibération d’un jury sur les attitudes, mais aucun effet sur l’identité civique personnelle et l’auto-efficacité politique.
Réciproquement, chaque attitude civique (à l’exception de la foi dans les concitoyens) fut prédictive de l’expérience délibérative dans au moins une des deux études.
Dans l’ensemble, l’étude soutient l’affirmation des théoriciens de la démocratie délibérative selon laquelle l’expérience d’une importante discussion face à face peut faire d’individus privés des citoyens publics en renforçant leur confiance dans leurs concitoyens et les institutions publiques.
Vom Gruppenmitglied zum demokratischen Bürger: Wie eine Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Jurymitgliedern die bürgerliche Einstellung verändern kann.

De Miembro de un Grupo a Ciudadano Democrático: Cómo la
Deliberación con Compañeros de Jurado Cambia las Actitudes Cívicas

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Resumen
Esta investigación evalúa el impacto actitudinal de uno de las más distintivas
y famosas actividades de grupo de los Estados Unidos—la deliberación por
jurado. Alexis de Tocqueville y la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos han
razonado que el servicio del jurado puede promover compromiso cívico.
Esta visión fue apoyada por investigaciones recientes. El presente estudio
examina si el impacto de la deliberación del jurado depende de la calidad de
la experiencia de sus miembros. Dos encuestas de panel de un total de 2,410
jurados pusieron a prueba la relación recíproca entre la experiencia subjetiva
de la deliberación y los cambios en las actitudes cívicas hacia uno mismo,
hacia los ciudadanos compañeros, y hacia las instituciones públicas. Los
resultados principales de los modelos de ecuación estructural mostraron
efectos múltiples de la deliberación de los jurados sobre las actitudes, pero
no encontraron efecto alguno sobre la identidad cívica de uno mismo y sobre
las políticas de eficacia propia. Recíprocamente, cada actitud cívica, con
excepción de la fe en los compañeros ciudadanos, predijo la experiencia
deliberativa en al menos 1 de los 2 estudios. En general, este estudio
refuerza la alegación de los teóricos de deliberación democráticos que una
consecuencia de la experiencia de conversaciones cara a cara puede
convertir a individuos más reservados en ciudadanos cívicos a través del
refuerzo de su confianza en los ciudadanos compañeros y las instituciones
dúnicas.
本研究评估了美国最显著、最著名的群体活动之一的陪审团审议所带来的态度方面的影响。Tocqueville 和美国最高法院都认为陪审团服务能促进平民参与。最近的研究也支持这种观点。本研究探讨了陪审团审议所产生的态度性影响是否取决于一个人陪审团经验的质量。我们调查了 2410 个陪审团成员，来检测审议的主观经验和对自己，同胞及公共机构之态度的变化这两者之间的互利关系。结构平等模式的分析结果表明：陪审团审议对态度变化造成多种影响，但没有影响到一个人的市民身份和政治方面的自我成就感。反过来，每种市民态度（但不包括对同胞的信心）可用来预测（两个研究中至少一个）审议经验。总的来说，本研究支持民主理论家对审议的假设，即面对面交谈的经验可以加强私人个体对同胞和公共机构的信心，从而使得他们变成公共市民。
본 연구는 미국의 가장 대표적이고 두드러진 집단 행위인 배심원의 속성적 영향을 평가한 것이다. 알렉시스 토크빌과 미국 대법원은 배심원 서비스가 시민 참여를 증가시킬 수 있다고 강조했으며, 최근의 연구들도 이러한 견해를 지지하고 있다. 본 연구는 배심원 심의의 속성적 영향이 개인의 심의 경험의 질에 의존하는지를 연구하였다. 전체 2,410 배심원들을 대상으로 한 두 패널 서베이가 심의의 주관적인 경험이 그들 자신, 동료시민들, 그리고 공공기관에 대한 시민적 태도의 변화간 상호관계를 조사하였다. 구조적 균형모델의 주요한 결과들은 태도들에 대한 배심원 심의의 다양한 영향을 보여주었으나, 개인들의 시민적 동일성이나 정치적 자기 표현에 대한 영향은 보여주지 않았다. 상호적으로, 동료시민들에 대한 믿음을 제외한 모든 시민적 태도는 두번의 연구중 적어도 한번의 연구에서 심의 경험의 예측도가 되었다. 전체적으로, 본 연구는 연속적인 대면 경험의 개인들을 동료시민들과 공공기관들에 대한 그들의 신뢰를 강화하는 것에 의해 공적 시민화로 이끌수 있다는 심의민주주의 이론가들의 주장을 대략적으로 지지하고 있다는 점을 확인하였다.